Here's a strange intersection of old-fashioned China-bashing by a well-known defender of Western imperialism, old and new, and a relatively serious discussion of labour conditions in DRC mines and the impacts of PF campaigning in Zambia. Shows the way in which the Zambian and DRC mine labour situations, which have long been ignored by academics, journalists and politicians, suddenly become more sexy when they bump into with the western pre-occupation du jour. The Chinese mines really aren't that much worse than those owned by other multinationals!
Anyway the long article is in the (British) Daily Mail.
5 comments:
Regarding your throw away last line that 'Chinese really aren't that much worse than those owned by other multinationals'. Please could you substantiate this a little more? When was the last time you went down a Chinese or 'other multinational' mine, especially underground, so that you can make a comparison? - bearing in mind that the article is discussing working conditions, not for example pay rates. Or are you totally relying on anecdotal evidence - not very academic - to tar all miners with the same brush?
Thanks for your comment. Have a look at the original 'For Whom the Windfalls?' report linked from the front page of this website. It includes a section asking 'are the Chinese the worst investors?' which discusses questions of comparative wages, health and safety, union representation, social sector provision etc. comparing Chambishi with other mines. My conclusion, in Zambia in 2006 when the research was done, was that pay and working conditions at Chambishi were the worst of all of the newly privatised mines. But not by that much. All of the companies, no matter teir national ownership, are engaged in casualisation of the workforce, and particularly in out-sourcing 'development' of new mines - the risky underground digging bit where the rooves of new tunnels fall in on those digging them. The copper boom makes this work hapen too fast for proper safety measures to be instiotued and the Zambian state is too weak to regulate the companies effectively (and possibly also lacks the political will to do so). Data from Mines Safety Department suggests that injuries and deaths are spread out across all of the mines, and are improving somewhat. The worst incident, mentioned by Hitchens, at Biggrimm, was thankfully an isolated one in terms of large numbers of deaths - one is obviously too many.
Then look at a couple of papers from the recent conference (again link from the front page of the website). There was an interesting debate at the conference between Professor Lee from UCLA and Janie Whitlock, both recently back from fieldwork in Chambishi, about the extent to which militant action by the miners (particularly wildcat strikes), and the Zambian political climate, had led to learning by Chinese managers and an improvement in the formal (see the 2008 Collective Agreement) which Prof Lee provided at the conference and I might be able to post onine, and informal terms and conditions of labour at NFC-A Chambishi. This is definately a topic worth discussing, but I would say that casualisation, health and safety, environmental control on the copperbelt in general are in a poor way, and that all of the companies are guilty. My concern is that the focus on the Chinese is a current fashion driven by i) Western anxieties about shifts in the global economy, ii) anxieties relating to real changes in the national profile of foreign owned companies in Zambia - specifically the arrival of new Chinese investors, iii) the reality of poor treatment of locals by Chinese managers (I never ek to deny this), iv) a degree of racism in both the West and Africa against the Chinese. The problem is not that this puts pressure on the Chinese to improve things - I am absolutely all for that. It is that it lets the rest, who employ many more Zambians than the Chinese in their *one, relatively small mine*, off the hook.
Hi Alastair,
I have in the past attempted to read through your 'For Whom the Windfalls' paper but gave up when I found some obvious omissions and factual errors in the first few pages. For example page 8 – under ‘the crisis of the ZCCM model’ you did not mention the rampant nepotism and corruption institutionalised from the top down at that time. The company was massively overstaffed and was haemorrhaging cash in the 90’s – and was unable to even lay off workers doing nothing due to the extremely lucrative retrenchment/retirement benefits – however these were less negotiated by the MUZ as claimed but put in place by the senior management to further feather their own nests on retirement as the benefits applied to all levels at staff – and senior management were on pretty impressive US$ salaries even by western standards at the time. In the late 90’s Luanshya Division – amongst others, had 1000s of workers on ‘recess’. Basically there was no work for them but ZCCM could not afford to retrench them so they were paid every month but never had to turn up to work. In addition there were 1000’s of ghost and dead workers earning a salary. During the first round of privatisations the World Bank and other institution contributed to pay off most of the recessed staff and finally buried the ghosts.
We won’t even get into the totally corrupt sale original of Luanshya Division to Binani in 1997 and the subsequent stripping of the assets by that company. Suffice to say how could ZCCM vendor finance anything at that time?
Other errors include page 12 ‘An acid plant, and the Kansanshi copper deposit were put together to form Bwana Mkubwa Mines Ltd.’ Bwana Mkubwa was not in any way part of the privatisation process – the mining licence over the area had been abandoned by ZCCM and Bwana Mkubwa Mining recognised the potential of the area and applied to the mining ministry in the normal way for a mining licence. The mine and associated acid plants were built solely by Bwama Mkubwa on a site where nothing previously existed – with no ZCCM input or shareholding. Kansanshi mining is a totally separate company which was part of the privatisation process and 80% of which was initially acquired by CAMAX which later sold its interest to FQM (who also own Bwana Mkubwa). By 2000 ZCCM had stopped all operations at Kansanshi and the operation was built from the ground up by FQM – there was no existing infrastructure there for mining – unlike the Copperbelt mines.
One of the reasons for casualisation of staff in Zambia is the onerous retrenchment and benefits system. It is a disincentive to companies to employ staff directly – it is almost impossible to lay-off poorly performing staff once in service. The retrenchment requirement of 2-3 months (or more) of final salary for each year served are a large long-term liability that many company’s prefer to avoid.
On a practical note – underground development need not be any more dangerous than other aspects of underground mining, in what is an inherently high-rick occupation, if carried out properly. I agree that using contractors to do this work means that safety can often be subservient to production and may cause more accidents. However, perhaps the reason for companies to use contractors for development requires visiting. Many development programmes are for short periods – say 6 months to a year. Mining companies do not want to take on people for such a short period and then have to go through the onerous process of laying them off. Nor do the companies wish to buy the equipment for short term work – it is an extremely inefficient use of capital. So contractors are often the logical answer. In many cases this should be praised as most contractors used on the Copperbelt are Zambian companies with profits retained in Zambia. However these companies may have to high a focus on profit and not enough on safety, as safety cost money.
I believe that conditions in Chinese operations, not only in Zambia but especially in the DRC, are massively worse that western run companies. The majority of western run companies operating in Zambia and DRC are instilling ’western’ safety standards, although this takes time – look at Albidon in the south for a great example. I admit this is not always altruistic – shareholders are becoming more militant and Zambian Mine Safety department more effective. Underground working practices in most Copperbelt operations have dramatically improved since the 90’s – as has the standard of the issued safety equipment. On the other hand, Chinese operations are the worst common denominator and installing Chinese standards – which I can assure you are far worse than the old ZCCM practices. The Zambian Mine Safety department is generally refused entry to Chambishi operations – and was anyone ever brought to count for the Chinese explosive factory disaster? Those liable were swiftly allowed to leave the country. I do not believe that this ‘lets the rest off the hook’ – it gives them an excuse – can just point to Chinese operations and say ‘well we are better than them’ – level playing field in Zambia required.
Hi Mike,
Thanks for engaging – I’ve been amazed there have been so few critical comments on the paper, so it’s good to get some corrections. Thanks for the clarification on Bwana Mkubwa, and I don’t doubt there was plenty of corruption in ZCCM and that terminal benefits were (still are in Luanshya) a massive political and economic issue.
The report wasn’t based on a vast field research, but my feeling was that there had been so little written since the privatisation process that a relatively quick and dirty NGO consultancy project could help start to record what had actually happened and hopefully provoke a debate – I think it succeeded on that level. Maybe you don't.
The good news, from the recent conference, is that there are a stream of researchers now preparing doctoral dissertations on mining, and soon we will have a much better documentary record of what’s going on. It’s vitally important that this work makes its way back to Zambia, so the next conference will hopefully be held on the Copperbelt.
I can’t pretend I have much sympathy for your comments on retrenchment, casualisation and contracting out. Of course companies try to avoid all costs. But, given the physical damage done to miners in the course of their very dangerous profession I don’t see 2-3 months of final salary for each year served as more than fair recompense. I don’t think that permanent contracts that allow individuals willing to risk their lives digging underground to plan for the future, borrow money etc. are too much to ask. My main criticism of the Zambian mining industry is that miners and communities face so many of the costs of mining and see so few benefits from what is, right now, a massively profitable business.
So, the question is whether foreign aid donors should push for a ‘flexible labour market’ which allows for this kind of thing, and whether the Zambian state should allow these kind of arguments to win out. An interesting paper at the conference, by Peter Kragelund, made the point that to the extent that Chinese investors get away with murder in Africa, we should consider why the regulations and regulatory authorities are so weak – partly because World Bank/IMF/WTO orthodoxy over the years has intentionally hacked away at the state and its ability to regulate. There may well also be questions to answer about the relationships between Western companies, Chinese companies and African state elites. I couldn’t prove anything in this area, but it’s hard not to wonder.
I haven’t worked on the DRC, and I don’t doubt there are abuses going on (as of course there are by Western companies – have a look at the UN report on corporate plunder in the Congo – though things may be improving http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=8706&Cr=democratic&Cr1=congo). That’s why I found Hitchen’s article interesting and valuable, if bizarre coming from an ardent defender of the free market and minimal state regulation.
Can you prove that MSD is generally refused entry at Chambishi? Also, better data from MSD on comparative levels of industrial accidents and deaths in the mines would be really useful. Transparency is no doubt the key to some improvements here and I would argue that it is in the enlightened interests of both the companies and the state. Neither seems to believe this for the moment and all seem to prefer a culture of secrecy and back-room dealing. Hardly any financial data or information on environmental pollution or safety record is published by the companies, regulators, Mines Ministry, ZRA. This is partly a question of capacity, partly a question of attitude. I included some information in the Windfalls report on what I think is a culture of impunity amongst western and Chinese management, partly encouraged by the weakness of MSD – I think interviewed mine managers spoke to me so honestly about their own abuses for the report in part because they couldn’t even imagine that it would come back to bite them. The press, puiblic and politicians have given them such an easy ride in general.
Finally, a level playing field would be a massive step forward. We might well disagree about how much room companies should have to casualise their labour forces, but Zambia certainly needs rules and the ability to apply them.
Thanks for taking the time to write in such detail.
All the best,
Alastair
I look forward to seeing some more research and discussions on the Zambian mining industry – and I do hope the mining companies engage fully to explain their position better – especially the likes of FQM and Equinox - which between them have revitalised the town of Solwezi in the last 8 years. Mining companies do not always get it right and have a number of opposing forces that they must try to appease – government, shareholders, stakeholders, etc. I do believe that missing force to many Chinese operations is shareholders – many western shareholders are becoming more activist, whereas Chinese are interested in only sourcing long-term supply of minerals to feed their own economy.
Underground mining in this day in the Copperbelt is generally not a ‘very’ dangerous profession causing ‘physical damage done to miners’ – except perhaps in the case of the Chinese operations where most workers are Chinese and safety is minimal. The other mines in the Copperbelt are almost totally mechanised – working underground involves driving loaders, trucks and operating jumbo drilling rigs from inside a cab. Yes there is plenty of manual work – as on a construction site – but the days of digging out rock with shovels and pick and pushing handcarts out the drive is over. Safety is paramount and procedures and training are becoming stricter. Worldwide the majority of incidents in the mining industry are a result of personnel not following procedures. I do not dispute that it is a dangerous environment with heavy equipment operating in confined spaces and in any such environment accidents do happen. However, only about a quarter of personnel employed by the mining companies are regular underground workers – the rest run the surface operations, admin, etc. Would it therefore be fair to be able to employ there people on contract basis as they are not ‘digging’ underground and being ‘physically damaged’?
I also believe that the perception that the Copperbelt mines are a ‘massively profitable business’ is currently overstated. It is a little hard to get actual numbers as Vedanta reports on a more global basis, Glencore is a private company and the Chinese report nothing. But there has been massive mining cost inflation if the past 5 years with prices of fuel, labour, electricity, steel, consumables, etc. rising considerably. The deep underground copper mines in Zambia – Mufulira, Nkana, Konkola – are amongst the highest cost copper operations in the world. They are probably the wettest mines in the world and require massive amounts of electricity for pumping water, the infrastructure is old and costly to operate and they remain overstaffed. I would estimate that the cost of operating there mines today is now in the region of US$2.5 – US$3 per pound of copper. Currently copper is selling for US$2.60 a pound – hardly ‘massively profitable’. FQM’s Kansanshi and Equinox’s Lumwana operations are much lower cost to operate, but heavily exposed to oil cost.
Post a Comment